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Defrosting the Chill: How Facial
Recognition Technology Threatens
Free Speech
Kirsten E. Roy*
INTRODUCTION

Law enforcement’s increased use of facial recognition technology (FRT) to aid investigations has sparked a nationwide conversation about the costs and benefits of such advanced technology.1
With FRT use on the rise, the implications of its use concerns legal
scholars, activists, and politicians alike because the software is
known to misidentify people of color, women, and other marginalized groups at a disproportionately high rate.2 For example, in
2018, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ran members of
* Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Roger Williams University School of
Law, 2022. A special thank you to Professor Hassel for her guidance throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my parents and Sam for
their unending love, encouragement, and support—thank you for always believing in my success!
1. See Ashley Deeks & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Facial Recognition Software: Costs and Benefits, LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-software-costs-and-benefits [https://perma.cc/
4YFN-JASA]; cf. Malkia Devich-Cyril, Defund Facial Recognition, THE
ATLANTIC (July 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/
07/defund-facial-recognition/613771/
[https://perma.cc/2Y4J-LB28] (facial
recognition technology used to surveil Black activists and journalists).
2. Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial Recognition Technology, ACLU (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-civil-rights-groups-call-biden-halt-federal-use-facial-recognitiontechnology [https://perma.cc/2SKW-B6ED].
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Congress’s faces through Amazon’s facial recognition software,
“Rekognition,” and the technology incorrectly identified twentyeight lawmakers as people who had committed crimes.3 In another
study, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that FRT
algorithms falsely matched Black women between twenty and
thirty-five percent of the time, while matching white men’s faces
correctly almost every time.4 In 2019, the United States Government released its own findings on FRT and concluded that FRT is
most effective when used on white men as it misidentifies people of
color, women, children, and the elderly at disproportionately high
rates.5 As a result of these disparities and concerns over bias, IBM,
Microsoft and Amazon have suspended the sale of FRT to law enforcement.6 Many jurisdictions in the United States banned law
enforcement’s use of FRT citing the potential civil liberty violations.7 The consensus is clear—if law enforcement agencies are to
use advanced technology like FRT, it must be highly accurate—
there is no room for error.
Even if FRT worked seamlessly and did not misidentify its subsets at a disproportionate rate, the “Orwellian” slippery slope that
could follow from such advanced technology is cause for concern.8
The ACLU is at the forefront of calls to defend against the threat of
FRT, advocating for Congress and the Biden Administration to take
immediate action to protect First Amendment and privacy rights.9
The ACLU maintains that FRT “threatens our expectation of privacy and its pervasive use chills our associational, speech, and
3. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members
of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (Jul. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/S59W-DPFT].
4. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH.
LEARNING RSCH. 77, 87 (2018).
5. See Karen Hao, A U.S. Study Confirms Most Face Recognition Systems
are Racist, TECH. REV. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/12/20/79/ai-face-recognition-racist-us-government-niststudy/ [https://perma.cc/S59W-DPFT].
6. See Devich-Cyril, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See generally Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of
Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 2; Letter from Kate Ruane, Senior
Legis. Couns., ACLU, to President Biden (Feb. 16, 2021).
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privacy rights unlike any technology previously deployed.”10 In a
coalition letter to President Biden, the ACLU’s Senior Legislative
Counsel Kate Ruane explained that FRT is responsible for the false
arrests of Black men and “[the technology] disproportionately misidentifies and misclassifies people of color, trans people, women and
other marginalized groups.”11 Ruane argued that the Biden Administration must address FRT as an “important first step” to keep
with its commitment to addressing racial inequality.12
This Comment will focus on FRT as it relates to the First
Amendment and the expression of such constitutionally protected
activities. In Part I, this Comment will highlight the rise of social
media activism, explain how it creates a unique risk for law enforcement agencies to abuse FRT, and provide an overview of the chilling
effect doctrine to the First Amendment. In Part II, this Comment
will argue that law enforcement’s use of FRT threatens to chill protected speech and thus, the utilization of FRT on individuals exercising constitutionally protected activities violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Comment will
then analyze whether the chilling effect gives rise to a legally cognizable injury and weigh the chilling FRT constitutional implications against the benefits of its use. Lastly, this Comment will argue that the executive or legislature must act and heavily regulate
FRT to mitigate any chilling effect on individuals exercising their
First Amendment rights.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Rise of Social Media Activism
It is no secret that social media usage is widespread in the
United States, but over the last decade, social media use has increased across all age demographics.13 The Pew Research Center
10. Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
11. Letter from Kate Ruane to President Biden, supra note 9.
12. Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
13. Social Media Use Has Grown Dramatically, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 27,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns/ft_18-0323_socialmediaprivacy/ [https://perma.cc/RCG9-APXX].
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conducted a study about the growth of social media from 2006 to
2018, finding that the vast majority of Americans use social media
every day.14 Americans turn to social media for a variety of reasons: connecting to friends and family, staying up-to-date about current events, and more recently, political activism. Given that twothirds (67%) of Americans read the news on social media,15 it is no
surprise that Americans have turned to online platforms for political debate and discussion.
In recent years, Americans utilized social media to engage in
activism. As of 2017, roughly half of Americans used social media
to discuss political and social issues.16 As a result of the COVID-19
pandemic, Americans spent more time at home in 2020 and consequently, more time on social media. Activists utilized social media
platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok to advocate for political and social change. For example, after a Minneapolis police officer, Derick Chauvin, killed George Floyd, a forty-sixyear-old Black man from Minneapolis, activists utilized social media platforms to protest systemic racism in the United States and
called for police reform.17 The horrific video sparked outrage across
the globe, causing millions to advocate for police accountability; express their solidarity with the Black community; and organize protests through social media. Clearly, Americans have a powerful tool
at their disposal to raise awareness and instigate change.18 The
strength of this movement not only forced Americans to see the
ubiquity of systemic racism in the United States, it also highlighted

14. See id.
15. News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept.
7, 2017), https://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/3GBB-GC24].
16. Activism in the Social Media Age, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 11, 2018)
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/07/11/public-attitudes-toward-political-engagement-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/UL4G-WZ7T].
17. Jon Emont & Philip Wen, How Protests Over George Floyd’s Killing
Spread Around the World, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2020, 10:02 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-helps-spur-global-protests-overgeorge-floyds-death-11591880851 [https://perma.cc/EJX4-HTCW].
18. See Shira Ovide, How Social Media Has Changed Civil Rights Protests,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/technology/social-media-protests.html [https://perma.cc/Z4V7-JXH3].
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the need for police reform which led to action.19 The United States
House of Representatives, for example, recently passed the George
Floyd Justice in Policing Act, which aims to reform policing.20 The
bill, if passed by the United States Senate, will address issues with
policing practices and law enforcement accountability.21 The
George Floyd Justice in Policing Act illustrates how social media
activism can enact actual change. Following the summer of 2020,
social media has become a prominent platform for American political discussion.22
For those who want to facilitate change, social media is an incredibly powerful means to accomplish that goal.23 For example,
during the 2020 election cycle most candidates utilized social media
to further their campaigns. Political figures turned to social media
platforms to reach their constituents about issues and encouraged

19. E.g., George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th
Cong. (2020).
20. Id. (“[The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act] addresses a wide range
of policies and issues regarding policing practices and law enforcement accountability for law enforcement misconduct, to enhance transparency and
data collection, and eliminate discriminatory policing practices. The bill facilitates federal enforcement of constitutional violations by state and local law
enforcement.”) If passed, the bill will create a Nation Police Misconduct Registry; lower the criminal intent standard required to convict a police officer
from willful to knowing or reckless; alter qualified immunity for law enforcement officers in civil actions; permit the Department of Justice to investigate
discriminatory police practices; and establish a framework for addressing racial profiling at the federal, state, and local level. Id.
21. See id.
22. See Kalhan Rosenblatt, A Summer of Digital Protest: How 2020 Became the Summer of Activism Both Online and Offline, NBC (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/summer-digital-protest-how-2020became-summer-activism-both-online-n1241001
[https://perma.cc/6A48FBAV].
23. See Amy B. Wang, Taylor Swift’s Endorsement of Democrats is Followed by a Spike in Voter Registration, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2018/10/09/taylorswifts-endorsement-democrats-causes-spike-voter-registrations/
[https://perma.cc/P4QN-WZM9]. Before the 2018 primary election, Taylor
Swift weighed in on politics and caused a spike voter registration among eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds. Within forty-eight hours of Swift’s Instagram
post, 169,000 new voters registered to vote in their respective states. See generally Taylor Swift (taylorswift), INSTAGRAM (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.instagram.com/p/BopoXpYnCes/ [https://perma.cc/C7ZC-9KQH].
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people to vote.24 And notably, on both sides of the aisle, Americans
utilized their social media platforms to raise awareness and support their candidates.25
While social media serves as an important platform for political
discussion, for all Americans, a July 2020 survey revealed that
Black Americans are most likely to use social media to engage in
political activism in the United States.26 Along with Black Americans, Hispanic and Asian Americans are more likely to utilize social
media activism than their white counterparts.27 This disparity is
likely a result of marginalized groups’ desire to call for political and
social change to address the inequities directly impacting their communities.28 In sum, social media activism is an important, effective, and efficient way for many Americans to exercise their First
Amendment rights and it is particularly important to mitigate any
threat FRT poses to social media activism because today, most political debate and discussion takes place online.
B. Law Enforcement Use of FRT
With the rise of social media activism, unrestricted use of FRT
presents a unique risk to Americans who want to use their online
platforms to raise awareness for political and social change. FRT
is powered by advanced algorithms which can recognize distinct
features of human faces and find matches almost instantly.29
These algorithms utilize databases containing hundreds of thousands of images.30 With one-half of Americans already in FRT databases and one in four police departments using FRT as a part of

24. E.g., Joe Biden (@JoeBiden), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2020, 6:46 AM),
https://twitter.com/joebiden/status/1323592258617188352?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/BJ5E-5M7T].
25. See Tom Murse, How Social Media Has Changed Politics, THOUGHTCO.
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/how-social-media-has-changedpolitics-3367534 [https://perma.cc/6FCG-TWUH].
26. Brooke Auxier, Social Media Continues to be Important Political Outlets for Black Americans, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/11/social-media-continue-to-be-important-political-outlets-for-black-americans/ [https://perma.cc/RC92-49F5].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Devich-Cyril, supra note 1.
30. Id.
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routine investigations,31 the potential scope of this technology is
alarming to activists, politicians, and legal scholars alike.32 The
problem is that facial recognition companies utilize images from
government databases and social media without the knowledge or
consent of the subjects.33 The FBI, for example, has a facial recognition database with 641 million images of people’s faces pulled
from passports and driver’s licenses.34 Clearview AI powers its
FRT database with photos from social media sites, in violation of
those companies’ terms of service.35 Legal experts and civil rights
advocates argue that using facial images to power a technology the
government can use for mass surveillance is dangerous as there are
significant privacy concerns at issue and potential infringement of
constitutionally protected activity.36 As a result of the significant
privacy concerns and constitutional implications of FRT, jurisdictions across the country are taking steps to mitigate any potential
threat to civil liberties.
Without knowledge, consent, or even a legitimate reason, law
enforcement agencies can use FRT to match individuals to images
derived from the Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) database or
platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.37 There is growing concern that FRT is a weapon for law enforcement against protestors.38 Activists and journalists argue that sharing movements
on social media is adding fuel to the fire and making it much easier
for the government to monitor political organizations without evidence of an actual threat.39 For example, Black Lives Matter

31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know it, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/4ABM-KWUJ].
36. Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
37. See Devich-Cyril, supra note 1; Hill, supra note 35.
38. See Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial
Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
39. See Madeleine Aggeler, Face of a Dissident: As Images from Protests
Circulate Online, Some Fear that Individuals Will Become Targets, THE CUT

192 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1
activists recently urged photojournalists and private citizens to
avoid sharing photographs of protestors’ faces at demonstrations.40
Law enforcement agencies could use images from demonstrations
to identify the participants, which in turn could result in further
surveillance, harassment, or arrest of groups that historically experienced the same.41 Without restrictions in place to protect social
media activism, such surveillance via FRT could further drive brutal policing and suppression of unpopular political minorities, especially Black activists who historically have faced unlawful surveillance from the government.42
Law enforcement agencies have used FRT to investigate and
surveil protestors in the past,43 but the scope of this use is unknown
as agencies are not required to disclose the use of FRT in court documents.44 At the recent demonstrations against police brutality
following the death of George Floyd, law enforcement agencies
across the country logged 270 hours of surveillance of protestors in

(June 24, 2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/06/face-of-a-dissident.html
[https://perma.cc/ES6P-RVVY].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Devich-Cyril, supra note 1.
43. In 2015, Baltimore police used FRT to identify protestors by linking
images to social media profiles. See Kevin Rector & Alison Knezevich, Maryland’s Use of Facial Recognition Software Questioned by Researchers, Civil Liberties Advocates, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 18, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-facial-recognition-20161017-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3X4C-F6ER]. More recently, FRT has been used to identify
protestors in Washington, D.C. and Miami. Justin Jouvenal & Spencer S. Hsu,
Facial Recognition Used to Identify Lafayette Square Protester Accused of Assault, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2020, 1:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/facial-recognition-protests-lafayettesquare/2020/11/02/64b03286-ec86-11ea-b4bc-3a2098fc73d4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TH67-4L2T]; Connie Fossi & Phil Prazan, Miami Police Used
Facial Recognition Technology in Protester’s Arrest, NBC MIAMI (Aug. 17, 2020,
7:14 PM), https://www.nbcmiami.com/investigations/miami-police-used-facialrecognition-technology-in-protesters-arrest/2278848/ [https://perma.cc/UY5DY42X].
44. Lauren Feiner & Annie Palmer, Rules Around Facial Recognition
Technology and Policing Remain Blurry, CNBC (June 14, 2021, 10:52 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/12/a-year-later-tech-companies-calls-to-regulate-facial-recognition-met-with-little-progress.html [https://perma.cc/2ALTSU4U]. But cf. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 14-188(b) (2020).
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fifteen different cities.45 The impact and scope of this surveillance
combined with police wearing body cameras equipped with FRT is
concerning, especially when law enforcement agencies are not required to disclose the use of FRT. Referencing public safety concerns, law enforcement agencies justify their surveillance because
some demonstrations have turned violent in the past and thus, the
agencies are conducting surveillance to prevent crime.46 This justification is anything but persuasive as without regulation, or a requirement that investigators use FRT only when there is a credible
threat, there is room for abuse of FRT and surveillance of politically
unpopular groups in the United States.
Successful use of FRT in recent investigations will likely result
in an expansion of FRT use among law enforcement agencies.47
Without regulation of FRT, and consideration for the disproportionate harm to communities of color, the risk of abuse is high.48 For
centuries, Black Americans and other unpopular political groups
were subject to unfair and unlawful treatment, especially from
those entrusted with the honor of protecting their communities.49
Congress has also raised concerns about the FBI’s unlawful surveillance of Black people.50 For example, at a 2018 Congressional hearing to discuss the FBI’s “Black Identity Extremist” designation,
U.S. Representative Karen Bass of California argued that the term

45. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, U.S. Watched George Floyd Protests in 15 Cities
Using Aerial Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protests-surveillance.html
[https://perma.cc/7AL4-JFPP].
46. E.g., Fossi & Prazan, supra note 43.
47. Following the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, FRT was
used to identify those involved and experts warn the success will lead to expanded use. Johana Bhuiyan, Facial Recognition May Help Find Capitol Rioters—But It Could Harm Others, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2021-02-04/facial-recognition-surveillance-capitol-riot-black-and-brown-communities [https://perma.
cc/UM8P-65ZF].
48. Id.
49. Wendi C. Thomas, The Police Have Been Spying on Black Reporters
and Activists for Years. I Know Because I’m One of Them., PROPUBLICA (June
9, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-police-have-been-spying-onblack-reporters-and-activists-for-years-i-know-because-im-one-of-them
[https://perma.cc/PMZ2-ZXP3].
50. See Complaint at 1–2, 6, 9–10, Center for Media Justice et. al. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 3:19-cv-01465 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2019).
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used in the FBI’s assessment “could be applied to ‘all protestors
demonstrating [to] end police violence against Black people.’”51 The
FBI’s conduct and intentions, coupled with advanced FRT, has
chilling constitutional implications if it is not addressed. Using
FRT on activists will threaten free speech as the software’s disproportionate harm to communities of color has the potential to further
perpetuate the suppression of the Black voice and other marginalized groups, through the fear of punishment for their association
with politically unpopular ideologies.52
C. The Chilling Effect Defined
The right to engage in political dissent is undoubtedly fundamental to democracy: the First Amendment states, “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or of the right
of the people peaceably to assemble.”53 The First Amendment protects an individual’s speech and expressions from government surveillance whether the intrusion is direct or indirect.54 A chilling
effect occurs when an individual is deterred from exercising free
speech, protected by the First Amendment, as a result of government action or laws specifically directed at the protected activity.55
A chilling effect is a severe threat to a healthy democracy because it has the power to diminish the public’s perception of the
government and the political process.56 The mere perception of government surveillance can chill an individual’s expression of constitutionally protected speech and association.57 A chilling effect occurs, for example, when an activist decides to not attend a political
event because the association with an unpopular political group
could lead to unlawful surveillance, retaliation, or punishment.58
When an individual refrains from engaging in otherwise protected
speech because of perceived governmental intrusion, this is

51. Id. at 10.
52. See Devich-Cyril, supra note 1.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling
the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689–90 (1978).
55. Id. at 693.
56. See id. at 691.
57. See id. at 693.
58. See id. at 685 n.2.
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sufficient to establish a chilling effect.59 A chilling effect occurs
when an individual alters his or her behavior because of a government action.60 For example, in Meese v. Keene, the Court concluded
that the plaintiff demonstrated “more than a subjective chill” and
evidence of “specific present objective harm or a threat of specific
future harm” because the plaintiff would suffer personal, political,
and professional harm impacting his ability to get re-elected if the
government designated his films as political propaganda.61
Even so, plaintiffs alleging a chill to free speech can rarely
demonstrate standing to challenge the government action.62 Pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, federal courts can only hear cases that arise out of an actual case or
controversy,63 meaning a cause of action does not arise simply because an individual or group dislikes a government action. Therefore, a party seeking to challenge a government action for its
chilling effect on free speech must have suffered an injury in fact,
or the invasion of a legally protected interest that is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent”; that the defendants’ challenged acts caused the injury; and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury.64 When the government infringes on
an individual’s First Amendment protections, this phenomenon
gives rise to a legally cognizable injury.65 While a chilling effect is
undoubtedly an invasion of a constitutionally protected interest,
“the difficulty [is] . . . convincing courts to recognize these consequences as constitutionally cognizable injuries-in-fact that give rise
to justifiable controversies as a matter of law.”66 A party alleging
a chilling effect cannot satisfy the Article III standing requirement

59. Id. at 713.
60. Id. at 689.
61. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1987) (quoting Keene v. Smith,
569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Ca. 1983)).
62. Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue Over Government Surveillance, 57
UCLA L. REV. 71, 81 (2009).
63. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
64. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
65. While there is consensus among courts that invasions of privacy from
being spied on are injurious, “plaintiffs have difficulty establishing that they
are, in fact, being spied on” for purposes of standing. Michelman, supra note
62, at 79.
66. Id. at 81.
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unless the injury is fairly traceable to the government action at issue. If an individual or group can only speculate as to whether surveillance will occur, this is insufficient to establish standing.67 As
such, without a credible threat of injury arising from government
surveillance, a party does not have standing to challenge a government action causing a chilling effect.68
Courts have concluded that the mere speculation that surveillance could occur is insufficient to establish standing.69 For example, in Amnesty International v. Clapper, the Second Circuit first
held—only to later be overruled—that a group of journalists and
attorneys defending terror suspects had standing based on their
reasonable fear of surveillance.70 The Second Circuit reasoned that
the journalists’ and attorneys’ fear was reasonable and based on a
“realistic understanding of the world.”71 Moreover, the plaintiffs
had taken financial measures to evade the surveillance authorized
by the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which the
Second Circuit explained, strengthened their claim.72 The ruling
traced the plaintiffs’ fears directly to the FISA, asserting that “[the
plaintiffs’] legitimate professions make it quite likely that their
communications will be intercepted if the government . . . exercises
the authority granted by the FISA amendment.”73 The Second Circuit reasoned that an individual’s reasonable fear that the government will monitor his or her communication is sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution.74 The Supreme
Court later overruled this decision and disagreed with the Second
Circuit’s reasoning, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge the FISA amendment.75 The Court reasoned that
merely alleging an objectively reasonable likelihood that the government would intercept the plaintiffs’ communications at some
point in the future under a provision of the FISA does not
67. Id. at 89.
68. Id.
69. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2013).
70. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 139 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d,
568 U.S. 398 (2013).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. at 139.
74. Id. at 122.
75. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 413 (2013).

2022]

PRIVACY LAW

197

demonstrate Article III standing because the injury is not fairly
traceable to the provision at issue.76 The Court further explained
that the plaintiffs inflicted financial harm on themselves based on
a fear of hypothetical surveillance that was not actually imminent.77 As such, the Court found a lack of standing because the
plaintiffs could only speculate as to whether any interception would
be under the FISA provision or some other authority.78
Where a party merely alleges that a government action caused
a chilling effect because the party refrained from exercising protected speech, without facts to support present objective harm or
imminent specific harm, the allegation does not give rise to an injury in fact.79 As Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit wrote,
“[not] every plaintiff who alleges First Amendment chilling effect
and shivers in court has thereby established a case or controversy”80 because, without the likelihood of an actual chill, the issue
will not give rise to a justiciable controversy.81 In Laird v. Tatum,
for example, the Court explained that “[mere] allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific
present objective harm or a threat of specific harm.”82 The Court
dismissed the case because the plaintiffs failed to prove a cognizable injury from the potential use of data collected by agents at public political meetings and protests.83 The issue is that it is nearly
impossible to determine which protected activities an individual
might take part in if there was not government surveillance, beyond
the individual’s perception.84 In sum, most courts conclude that
subjective chills, perceived by the plaintiff, are “too ephemeral or
idiosyncratic to constitute an injury.”85 However, these arguments

76. Id.
77. Id. at 416.
78. Id. at 412–14.
79. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
80. Nat’l Student Ass’n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1113–14 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
81. Id.
82. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14.
83. See id.
84. Sunny Skye Hughes, U.S. Domestic Surveillance After 9/11: An Analysis of the Chilling Effect on First Amendment Rights in Cases Filed against
the Terrorist Surveillance Program, 27 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 399, 404 (2012).
85. Michelman, supra note 62, at 81.
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fail to consider that the government’s records are often confidential
and plaintiffs are thus unable to obtain sufficient evidence to establish the government was monitoring their expression of constitutionally protected speech.86
While it is insufficient to merely allege that a specific government action has a subjective chilling effect on speech or association,
courts have concluded that a plaintiff can satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement when the chilling effect “arises from an objectively justified fear of real consequences.”87 For example, “the . . . requirement [may be satisfied] by showing a credible threat of prosecution.”88 Plaintiffs have also successfully established standing based
on a chilling effect when they have taken steps to protect communications from government surveillance to ensure privacy.89 For
example, in Presbyterian Church v. United States, members of the
church argued that they suffered legally cognizable harm because
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents wore listening devices to church meetings to monitor a specific movement.90
The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs suffered a legally cognizable
injury because members canceled church activities, withdrew their
financial contributions and participation, and were “less open” during prayer and confession services.91 As such, the plaintiffs had
standing because they had suffered concrete injuries while undertaking efforts to circumvent tangibly oppressive government surveillance.92
The fear of government surveillance increases when the individual associates with politically unpopular groups, because for
these political minorities, the threat of unlawful surveillance and
other forms of punishment is much more likely.93 The Supreme

86. See id.
87. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1182
(10th Cir. 2010).
88. Id.
89. See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521–23 (9th
Cir. 1989).
90. See id. at 520.
91. Id. at 521–22.
92. See id. at 522.
93. See Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556–57
(1963).
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Court recognized this distinction in Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee, emphasizing that:
[A]ll legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these
[constitutional] protections, they are all the more essential
here, where the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and
the deterrent and “chilling” effect on the free exercise of
constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more immediate
and substantial.94
When a government action deters a politically unpopular group
from engaging in the free exercise of constitutionally protected
speech, the chilling effect is much more actual.95 For example, in
Gibson, the Court was particularly concerned with the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee’s motive for demanding the
NAACP’s membership records, referencing the “intense resentment
and opposition of the politically dominant white community.”96 The
Court concluded that the Committee “laid no adequate foundation
for its direct demands upon officers and records of a wholly legitimate organization for disclosure of its membership; [and] had neither demonstrated nor pointed out any threat to the State [stemming from the NAACP or its agenda].”97 The Committee sought
the NAACP’s records of membership because the association allegedly had ties to communism, a politically unpopular ideology, and
the underlying reason for demanding the membership records was,
presumably, to monitor and suppress the collective voice of a legitimate organization that challenged white supremacy and advanced
racial justice.98 Politically unpopular groups are more at risk of
having their voice suppressed because their views do not align with
political majorities and thus, it is important to consider any chilling

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 555.
See id. at 555–56.
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effect affecting political minorities to preserve and protect the free
expression of constitutionally protected speech.99
For the purposes of this Comment, the framework of the
chilling effect analysis will proceed as follows. First, a chilling effect occurs when a government action will potentially “limit a citizen’s perceived freedom in the exercise of their First Amendment
rights.”100 This includes government policies or actions that authorize surveillance of free speech, expression, and association.
Second, the chilled activity must have “genuine social utility,” such
as political debate, protest, and other communications related to
encouraging the democratic process.101 Third, the government action must cause a fear of punishment that results in an individual
refraining from exercising constitutionally protected activities.102
Article III requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged
government action creates an objective fear of harm to First
Amendment rights.103 Subjective fear of harm is insufficient to establish a legally cognizable injury.104 A plaintiff can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement when the chilling effect arises from an objectively justified fear of real consequences.105 Article III standing
is established by demonstrating a particularized, concrete injury
that is caused by the government’s challenged conduct, and can be
remedied by a favorable court decision for the plaintiffs.106 The
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of government surveillance and that they were in fact the target of such surveillance.107
Lastly, the plaintiff must allege specific harm such as damage to
“personal, political, or professional reputation; economic injury; loss
of organization membership; decreased or altered communication;
or the creation of new communication safeguards.”108 If a plaintiff
establishes they are vulnerable to a particular chilling effect the

99. See id. at 556–57; see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487,
494 (1965); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965).
100. Hughes, supra note 84, at 406.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Court must consider the totality of the circumstances at issue.
Courts decide whether a government regulation on First Amendment freedoms has a chilling effect on a case-by-case basis, taking
into consideration:
(1) the severity and scope of the alleged chilling effect . . .
(2) the likelihood of other opportunities to vindicate such
First Amendment rights . . . and (3) the nature of issues
which full adjudication must resolve, and the need for factual referents in order properly to define and narrow the
issues.109
II. ANALYSIS

A. Law Enforcement Use of FRT Chills Free Speech
Law enforcement use of FRT chills social media activism because the software deters activists from utilizing social media, substantially undermining the effectiveness of their organizing and
causing a real curtailment of their rights of speech and assembly.110
Not only are activists deterred from engaging in social media advocacy, they often will not attend protests because they fear surveillance from the government via FRT and the vast databases of social
media images that power facial recognition software.111 Knowing
law enforcement agencies could easily run social media photos from
protests through facial recognition software is enough to deter some
from even participating in otherwise protected activities.112 For example, Kishon McDonald, a protester against racial injustice, admitted the use of FRT at protests would “cause him to think twice
before attending.”113 The mere fact law enforcement agencies can
use FRT on individuals participating in constitutionally protected
activities raises First Amendment concerns, Clare Garvie, of
Georgetown University Law School’s Center on Privacy and Technology argued that “the use of [FRT] or even the potential use . . .
may cause people to alter their behavior in public, self-censor or not

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Nat’l Student Ass’n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Jouvenal & Hsu, supra note 43.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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participate in constitutionally protected activity.”114 As such, it is
important to look at FRT with scrutiny as the use implicates the
First Amendment, a fundamental right and cornerstone of our democracy.
The increased use of FRT to aid investigations threatens to
chill social media activism, a powerful tool to engage in political debate and discussion because activists alter their behavior in response to FRT use.115 As the Supreme Court said in New York
Times v. Sullivan, “[the] debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” and thus when a government action
infringes on these long-recognized and valued rights, individuals
are deterred from engaging in political debate and discussion because they fear retaliation.116 Without social media as an avenue
for political discussion, the growing number of Americans that rely
on social media to organize and express political ideas are effectively silenced. When the government infringes upon these rights,
not only does it threaten our democracy, but it also diminishes the
trust that people have for our government, leaving these individuals vulnerable to a chilling effect.117 Individuals should be free to
engage in social media activism without the fear of law enforcement
agencies using FRT to unlawfully surveil their protected speech.
As discussed in the preceding section, politically unpopular
groups are most vulnerable to a chilling effect because the software
is notoriously bias against marginalized groups, whose political
views are more progressive.118 The use of FRT is particularly concerning because the technology misidentifies people of color,
women, children, and the elderly at disproportionately high
rates.119 Moreover, the mere perception that law enforcement
agencies use FRT and power the software with photos from social
114. Id.
115. See Michelman, supra note 62, at 96.
116. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
117. See Michelman supra note 62, at 78–79.
118. See Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556–57
(1963).
119. Drew Harwell, Federal Study Confirms Racial Bias of Many Facial
Recognition Systems, Casts Doubt on their Expanding Use, WASH. POST (Dec.
19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/19/federalstudy-confirms-racial-bias-many-facial-recognition-systems-casts-doubt-theirexpanding-use/ [https://perma.cc/Z6U7-4E6L].
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media is enough to deter an individual from expressing their political views online.120 There is concern among activists and journalists that the government will use FRT to conduct surveillance at
political protests and then individuals associated with politically
unpopular ideas will face punishment.121
The scope of law enforcement use of FRT is largely unknown,
making it especially difficult to challenge for its chilling effect on
free speech. Until recently, law enforcement agencies did not even
disclose to defendants when investigators use FRT during an investigation.122 After the arrest of a protester in summer 2020, prosecutors revealed in court documents for the first time that officials
used FRT to identify the individual accused of assaulting a police
officer.123 Without the help of FRT, law enforcement may never
have identified the suspect. These instances are increasingly common; in Miami, police used FRT to identify a protester accused of
throwing rocks at officers; the NYPD used FRT to identify and harass a protester who yelled at police with a megaphone; the Philadelphia police used FRT and images from social media to identify
protestors accused of vandalism.124
While the actual scope of law enforcement use of FRT is not
clear, the consensus is that even sharing photos and videos of protestors on social media could expose activists to potential misidentification, harassment, and arrest.125 As such, activists are deterred from using social media, a crucially important tool for
modern activists, to organize and engage in political discussion.
Nevertheless, the next section will discuss whether this deterrence
amounts to a legally cognizable injury where a plaintiff could challenge FRT for its chilling effect.

120. Heather Kelly & Rachel Lerman, America is Awash in Camera, a Double-Edged Sword for Protesters and Police, WASH. POST. (June 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/03/cameras-surveillance-police-protesters/ [https://perma.cc/K9GE-9XTF].
121. Id.; see also Telephone Interview by Jannie Jackson with Claire
Garvie, Senior Associate, Ctr. on Privacy & Tech. at Geo. L. (June 26, 2020).
122. See Jouvenal & Hsu, supra note 43.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Harwell, supra note 119.
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B. Deterrence from Social Media Activism as an Injury-in-Fact
While the subjective fear of future surveillance via FRT is insufficient to create standing, if activists refrain from using the powerful tool of social media to engage in political debate and discussion
because of FRT, this could give rise to a legally cognizable injury.126
Without a credible threat of punishment or actual harm caused by
FRT, any plaintiff seeking to challenge FRT would not have standing as Article III requires.127 This section will discuss how activists’
deterrence from social media activism could amount to actual harm,
sufficient to establish a legally cognizable injury because a crucial
tool for organizing has been effectively stripped from the hands of
activists due to credible fears of FRT.128
With respect to law enforcement use of FRT, there is no direct
evidence to support an allegation that officers use FRT on individuals peacefully exercising their First Amendment rights or that the
government has used FRT in a way that would directly cause
harm.129 Like the plaintiffs in Laird, who argued the Army’s data
gathering system chilled their First Amendment rights but failed
to establish standing because the fear was speculative, a plaintiff
challenging FRT for its chilling effect faces this same hurdle.130
While the threat of future harm concerns activists because law enforcement agencies can misuse FRT in ways that would compromise
civil rights and thus, deter people from engaging in such constitutionally protected activities, like the plaintiffs in Laird, these subjective concerns are not adequate to establish standing because
there is no claim of a specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm to those peacefully exercising their First
Amendment rights.131
An activist seeking to challenge FRT for its chilling effect on
his First Amendment rights could overcome the Article III hurdle
if he can demonstrate that he chose not to engage in social media
activism because of FRT, or otherwise altered his behavior because
126. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473, 475 (1987).
127. See Michelman, supra note 62, at 84–85.
128. See infra Part II.B.
129. “[T]he system is never used to gather intelligence on peaceful demonstrations . . . .” Jouvenal & Hsu, supra note 43.
130. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1971).
131. Id.
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of FRT.132 An activist would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
only when the chilling effect arises from an objectively justified fear
of real consequences.133 For example, if an activist took steps to
privatize their social media platform to prevent law enforcement
agencies from using his photos and videos to run facial recognition
matches, this would be sufficient.134 Like the plaintiffs in Presbyterian Church v. United States, who the Court found suffered legally cognizable harm once members canceled church activities,
withdrew their financial contributions and participation, and were
“less open” during prayer and confession services because of the
INS’ presence at their meetings, an activist who takes steps to prevent the government from accessing their political activism on social media has suffered a legally cognizable injury.135 Like the
church members who had standing because they undertook efforts
to circumvent tangibly oppressive government surveillance, an activist who privatizes their platform because he is afraid of government retaliation as a result of their social media activism, has suffered legally cognizable harm to his First Amendment rights.136
The next hurdle this plaintiff encounters however is proving that
the government’s use of FRT deterred their social media activism
when the government is not even required to disclose its use of FRT
during an investigation.137
While the government is starting to disclose when it uses FRT
on protestors accused of wrongdoing, the concern is that when law
enforcement agencies use FRT on those who are peacefully exercising their First Amendment rights, the agency would not disclose its
use.138 For example, the FBI at this juncture denies using FRT on
peaceful demonstrators and maintains that FRT is only deployed

132. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987).
133. See Michelman, supra note 62, at 106.
134. See Meese, 481 U.S. at 473.
135. Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir.
1989).
136. Id.
137. See Jouvenal & Hsu, supra note 43.
138. For example, “public defenders, defense attorneys and facial recognition experts were unaware of the existence of the National Capital Region Facial Recognition Investigative Leads System.” Jouvenal & Hsu, supra note 43.
Its use was disclosed in court documents following the arrest of a protester in
Lafayette Square. See id.
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on protestors when a crime was allegedly committed.139 The ACLU
has alleged that the FBI is using FRT to conduct surveillance of a
group identified as “Black Identity Extremists,” without evidence of
an actual threat or organization under that designation.140 In
2018, at a hearing to discuss the FBI’s “Black Identity Extremist”
designation, Representative Bass argued that the term used in the
FBI’s assessment “could be applied to ‘all protestors demonstrating
[to] end police violence against Black people.’”141 If the FBI is using
FRT to surveil Black activists the fear of punishment becomes a
much more credible threat. The FBI failed to provide the requested
documents, which are now the subject of a Freedom of Information
Act lawsuit the ACLU and Center for Media Justice filed.142 These
records, if produced, could constitute a specific present objective
harm to the subjects of the surveillance by exposing the government’s use of FRT to conduct unlawful surveillance. The FBI’s designation coupled with advanced FRT will have chilling constitutional implications if it is not addressed.
When a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government action for
its chilling effect demonstrates that he or she was in fact the target
of government surveillance and alleges specific harm such as damage to “personal, political, or professional reputation; economic injury; loss of organization membership; decreased or altered communication; or the creation of new communication safeguards” that
plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury.143 An activist
seeking to challenge FRT for its chilling effect would have to demonstrate not only that the government is using FRT to conduct surveillance of politically unpopular groups but allege specific harm
resulting from the government action like the financial
139. Id.
140. Leaked FBI Documents Raise Concerns About Targeting Black People
Under “Black Identity Extremist” and Newer Labels, ACLU (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/leaked-fbi-documents-raise-concernsabout-targeting-black-people-under-black-identi-1
[https://perma.cc/H7JJ57ZU].
141. Freedom of Information Act Request for FBI Records on So-Called
“Black
Identity
Extremists,”
ACLU
(March
21,
2019),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_cmj_analysis_of_
foia_documents_on_so-called_black_identity_extremists_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T9FE-A6J7].
142. Id.
143. See Michelman, supra note 62, at 84 n.56.
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consequences of not sharing political content or taking steps to privatize social media to evade surveillance.144 Nevertheless, because
establishing standing under these circumstances presents unique
difficulties for a plaintiff seeking to challenge the government’s use
of FRT, the executive or legislative branches are best suited to address the constitutional implications of FRT.
C. Mitigating the Chilling Effect
Law enforcement agencies having unregulated access to FRT
threatens to chill free speech for any politically unpopular group
and thus, the legislative and executive branches must take action
to mitigate the threat to protected speech.145 As discussed above,
establishing standing to challenge a government action is a difficult
hurdle and is more complicated due to the lack of information about
the scope of law enforcement use of FRT.146 While a full moratorium on FRT is not a practical solution, there are steps the legislative and executive branches can take to mitigate the chilling effect
FRT has on free speech.147 This section will weigh the benefits of
FRT against the potential chilling effect the software has.
After the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol Building,
authorities were quick to utilize the powerful tools at their disposal
to aid the investigation, including FRT.148 In fact, officials cited the
combination of top-notch security footage and incriminating photographs with videos posted on social media as an “ideal data set for
facial recognition.”149 Investigators’ use of FRT undoubtedly made
it easier to identify those involved with the attack on the U.S. Capitol.150 Former FBI special agent Doug Kouns compared the attack

144. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
145. See Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial
Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
146. See supra nn. 111–22.
147. See Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial
Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
148. Craig Timberg, Drew Harwell & Spencer S. Hsu, Police Let Most Capitol Rioters Walk Away But Cellphone Data and Videos Could Now Lead to
More Arrests, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021, 5:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/08/trump-mob-tech-arrests/
[https://perma.cc/FY28-S37U].
149. Id.
150. Id.
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to September 11, 2001, and emphasized that “[the FBI will] use
every resource they can to bring these people to justice.”151
The role of FRT in identifying those involved with the attack
on the U.S. Capitol points to an important question: are there times
when authorities should use such advanced technology? On one
hand, there is strong public policy that supports law enforcement
access to FRT for investigations.152 The software can help authorities locate missing persons, deter terrorism, and investigate crimes
like human trafficking.153 Unfortunately, the risk of abuse—the
software could chill free speech—complicates these potential benefits.154 Law enforcement agencies across the country were quick to
utilize FRT to identify and charge those involved in the January 6,
2021, attack.155 The combination of security footage and social media posts made it much easier to identify and charge those involved.156 Not only does the U.S. Capitol Building have advanced
security cameras, many of those involved posted incriminating photographs and videos on social media.157 As discussed before, the
clear shots of the faces, combined with good lighting and many different angles, is an “ideal data set for facial recognition.”158
It is important to distinguish using FRT to assess credible public safety concerns from using the software to conduct surveillance
of protestors. While the government has a legitimate interest in
using FRT to investigate, if the means of doing so is premature and
infringes on the constitutionally protected activities of others, the
use is overinclusive. For example, using FRT at a protest because
there is a potential for illegal activity, the use could chill the constitutional rights of those peacefully protesting. In contrast, when authorities used FRT to aid their investigation of the January 6, 2021,

151. Id.
152. See Bernard Marr, Facial Recognition Technology: Here Are the Important Pros and Cons, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2019, 12:31 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/08/19/facial-recognition-technology-here-are-the-important-pros-and-cons/?sh=68a005c214d1
[https://perma.cc/G9WW-Y8Z2].
153. See id.
154. See Jouvenal & Hsu, supra note 43.
155. See Timberg, Harwell & Hsu, supra note 148.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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attack, this was after-the-fact to investigate those who had already
engaged in illegal conduct and incited an attack on the United
States government. Reflecting on the incident, Evan Greer, deputy
director of Fight for the Future argued that when a crisis occurs
“people are more willing to accept government overreach,” suggesting the public would approve of FRT use to investigate the January
6, 2021, incident because the attack was so severe.159
There are clear benefits of FRT, but civil rights activists and
legal scholars argue the success of FRT to investigate the January
6, 2021, attack will lead to expanded use, without proper measures
to protect the marginalized groups that are disproportionately at
risk of misidentification and most vulnerable to experiencing a chill
to free speech.160 As such, if law enforcement agencies intend to
expand the use FRT, the legislative and executive branches must
step in to regulate its use and mitigate the technology’s chilling effect on free speech. For example, in a coalition letter to President
Biden, the ACLU urged the Administration to place a moratorium
on all federal use of FRT until Congress can enact safeguards to
protect privacy interests and prevent bias.161 Other proposed solutions include asking the Biden Administration to support the Facial
Recognition and Biometric Technology Act, which would impose a
moratorium on FRT use and limit the use of federal funding to pay
for FRT.162 If Congress enacted safeguards to protect the First
Amendment rights of citizens and laid out specific circumstances
where law enforcement agencies can use FRT, these safeguards
would mitigate the harms of the technology. In sum, the legislative
and executive branches are best suited to regulate FRT because
proving an injury-in-fact and a justiciable controversy is nearly impossible without full disclosure of FRT use.
CONCLUSION

Law enforcement’s use of FRT threatens freedom of speech and
association because it deters individuals from engaging in constitutionally protected activities. While any challenge to FRT for its
159. Id.
160. See supra nn. 41–50.
161. See Civil Rights Groups Call on Biden to Halt Federal Use of Facial
Recognition Technology, supra note 2.
162. See id.
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chilling effect may not give rise to a legally cognizable injury as
there is no specific or credible threat to those peacefully exercising
First Amendment rights, based on information available to the public about the scope of law enforcement use of FRT, the threat warrants swift action. Law enforcement’s continued use of FRT will
cause irreparable harm to politically unpopular groups because
these individuals are most at risk of experiencing a chilling effect
to their First Amendment rights. As such, Congress and the Biden
Administration must take action to mitigate the threat of FRT as
its continued use will cause irreversible damage to our democracy
as the technology will discourage individuals from engaging in political debate and discussion; drive brutal policing; and perpetuate
the mistrust marginalized groups have for the government.

